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Can transfers reduce violence?:

Evidence a cash, food and voucher pilot in Ecuador
and implications for the Transfer Project

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Introduction

- Multi-country studies on intimate partner violence (IPV) show 1 in 3 women globally have experienced physical and/or sexual IPV during their lifetime ([Devries et al. 2013](#))
- Host of detrimental impacts on women themselves, with the ultimate consequence of mortality, however also many impacts on children and society at large.
- Rigorous evidence from developing countries on what works to prevent IPV, is lacking ([Heise 2012](#))
- Poverty-targeted cash transfers are proposed as a promising instrument to reduce IPV, however evidence is scarce

IPV in Economic Theory

IPV is modeled using household bargaining models, which depend on resources, threat points and outside opportunities.

Theory	Role of IPV	Response to increase in woman's income [resources]
Expressive	Improve aggressor's self-esteem or release frustration	Decrease in IPV
Extractive	Extract resources from the victim or her family	Increase in IPV
Instrumental	Control the victim's behavior or allocation of resources within the household	Ambiguous relationship with IPV

Case study from pilot intervention in Ecuador

1. Provide evidence on impact of transfers on IPV
2. Understand if impact varies by modality (cash, vouchers, food)
3. Explore pathways through which impacts are realized

Broader questions:

- How would we build a framework for thinking about this relationship more generally?
- What can the Transfer Project add?


WFP Intervention: Objectives

- Improve food consumption by facilitating access to more nutritious foods
- Increase the role of women in household decision-making related to food consumption
- Reduce tensions between Colombian refugees and host Ecuadorian populations



The Intervention

- Targeting:
 - Colombian refugees and poor Ecuadorians
 - 7 urban centers in Carchi (highland) and Sucumbíos (lowland)
 - Targeted to women (76%)
- 6 monthly transfers of \$40:
 - **Food:** Rice, oil, lentils, canned sardines
 - **Vouchers:** Redeemable for the purchase of approved foods at supermarket
 - **Cash:** Preprogrammed ATM cards
- Conditional on nutrition training





Study design


- **RCT** (145 clusters):
 - Neighborhoods randomly assigned food, cash, voucher or comparison
- The baseline sample had 2,357 households
- **Baseline** (March-April 2011) **Endline** (October-Nov 2011)
- **Analysis sample** (1,231 women)
 - One woman aged 15 - 69 at baseline
 - In a partnership in the last 6 months,
 - Available to be administered IPV module
- Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) probit models with set of standard controls and clustered standard errors

IPV measures

- Conflict Tactics Scale (19 indicators, behaviorally specific)
- In the past 6 months, has your spouse/partner ever:
 - **Controlling behaviors:** *“Limited contact with friends”*
 - **Emotional:** *“Humiliated you in front of others”*
 - **Physical/sexual:** *“Pushed or thrown something at you . . .Hit strangled, attacked with weapon”. . .
“Forced you to have sexual relations when you did not want to”*
- WHO protocol for ensuring confidentiality and referral services


An aside: Food security impacts and cost-effectiveness

- Large impacts on food security, dietary diversity, caloric intake, consumption among all modalities



USD cost of food transfer relative to cash transfer

Results on 6-month IPV: Pooled transfer



- No significant differences in between modalities

What were the Mechanisms?: Qualitative follow-up study

Conducted in 2013 including 48 in-depth interviews (women) and 8 FGD (men and women). Evidence of pathways:

1. Reduced daily stress within couple
2. Improved household well-being
3. Increases in women's empowerment

“No, because I did not ask for it [money for food] anymore...the arguments mostly happened when I asked for money for food, and he usually did not have any money” (female, IDI, Tulcan)

“Well, I think that it [relationship with partner] improved a lot, because as we were saying, the way to a man's heart is his stomach, so the basic food improves the relationship, and the family gets integrated...” (male, FGD, Nueva Loja)

Conclusions

- Transfers and other programs with poverty-objectives have potential for positive spillover effects on intrahousehold outcomes—however dynamics may differ by type of economic empowerment program
- Close attention to heterogeneous groups (in particular baseline power dynamics) within program recipients and how these may modify impacts
- Need for more impact evaluations and mixed method supporting evidence in diverse settings over long term. RCTs and other quasi-experimental work is needed beyond associations

Zooming out. . . Global evidence

- Realist review of cash transfers and IPV (in progress, joint with IFPRI & LSHTM)
- Focus on the evidence – as well as mechanisms
- So far: 25 identified papers (mostly unpublished)
- Approximately half quantitative, half qualitative:
 - 15 LAC
 - 2 MENA/Northern Africa
 - 8 SSA
- Nearly all quantitative papers identify reductions in IPV (although few identify increases among sub-samples)

A framework

Household
non-targeted
cash transfer

Women-
targeted
cash transfer


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
Cash 'plus':
Additional
participatory
group, skills
building or
links to
services

**Decreased
IPV**

**Increased
IPV**

A framework





**“Elephant on the slide”:
Gender-social norms**

How can the Transfer Project contribute?

- Collecting measures of violence in two evaluations
- Baselines both collected in August/September 2015:
 - Ghana LEAP 1000: IPV measures, primarily mother's or pregnant women with young children
 - Tanzania PSSN: GVB measures, including IPV, but among a variety of perpetrators
- Focus on informing pathways, rather than just impacts
- These will be first evidence from national programs in SSA. . . So stay tuned!

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Empirical Specification

- Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) probit models :

$$Y_{ij1} = \alpha + \beta_T Treat_j + \gamma Y_{ij0} + \delta P_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

- Y_{ij1} = IPV outcome of interest at follow-up
- Y_{ij0} = IPV outcome of interest at baseline
- $Treat$ = Received transfer
- P_{ij} = Province of residence
- Covariates (woman's age, partner's age, woman's education, partner's education, born in Colombia, marital status, indigenous or Afro Ecuadorian, labor force participation, high sole or joint decision-making power, number of children 0–5 years old in HH, number of children 6–15 years old in HH, wealth, and province of residence)

TABLE 1—BASELINE MEANS BY POOLED TREATMENT AND CONTROL GROUPS

	Observations	All	Control	Treatment	<i>p</i> -value of diff.
Attrition rate	1,433	0.14	0.16	0.14	0.31
<i>Female characteristics</i>					
Head of household	1,226	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.15
Born in Colombia	1,226	0.36	0.39	0.34	0.40
Age	1,226	34.84	35.29	34.66	0.43
Some secondary education or higher	1,226	0.38	0.38	0.39	0.87
Married	1,226	0.42	0.42	0.43	0.83
Indigenous	1,226	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.53
Afro-Ecuadorian	1,226	0.07	0.06	0.07	0.66
Worked in the last six months	1,226	0.32	0.31	0.33	0.56
Sole owner of house	1,226	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.44
<i>Partner Characteristics</i>					
Partner has some secondary education or higher	1,226	0.38	0.36	0.39	0.42
Partner's age	1,226	38.62	39.20	38.39	0.33
Partner was employed in the last six months	1,226	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.66
Partner's hours worked in a typical week	1,226	46.58	47.27	46.32	0.57
<i>Household Characteristics</i>					
Number of children 0–5 years old in household	1,226	0.75	0.72	0.75	0.52
Number of children 6–15 years old in household	1,226	0.92	1.02	0.87	0.05
Value of total monthly consumption per capita (USD)	1,222	106.60	107.32	106.31	0.86
House does not have rooms exclusively for sleeping	1,226	0.15	0.13	0.15	0.37
Lifetime physical and or sexual violence	1,226	0.35	0.33	0.35	0.64
Controlling behaviors	1,226	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.87
Emotional violence	1,226	0.26	0.24	0.27	0.36
Physical and or sexual violence	1,226	0.16	0.12	0.18	0.05
<i>p</i> -value from joint <i>F</i> -test					0.16

Notes: *p*-values are reported from Wald tests on the equality of means of pooled treatment and control for each variable. Comparison of means for female characteristics, partner characteristics, household characteristics, and IPV are conducted on the sample of women in the analysis with both baseline and endline data. Standard errors are clustered at the cluster level.

Summary of individual IPV indicators

	Endline control mean (I)
<i>Panel A. Controlling behaviors</i>	
Accused you of being unfaithful	0.16
Tried to limit your contact with your family	0.16
Tried to limit your contact with friends	0.17
Wanted to know where you were at all times	0.24
<i>Panel B. Emotional violence</i>	
Humiliated or insulted you	0.26
Threatened to leave you	0.15
Threatened to take away your children	0.08
Threatened to hurt you or someone you care about	0.05
Ignored you or was indifferent towards you	0.23
Humiliated or insulted you in front of others	0.16
<i>Panel C. Physical or sexual violence</i>	
Pushed you or shook you or threw something at you	0.13
Slapped you or twisted your arm	0.11
Hit you with his fist or something else that could hurt you	0.09
Kicked you or dragged you	0.06
Tried to choke or burn you	0.04
Attacked you with a gun, knife, or other weapon	0.01
Threatened you with a gun, knife, or other weapon	0.01
Physically forced you to have sexual intercourse	0.05
Forced you to do something sexual that you found degrading	0.03