

## Graduation from what & for whom?

**Fabio Veras (IPC-IG)**

*Did the evaluations of BRAC assess if people fell back into poverty after they were 'graduated'?*

No, they did not. There is a paper that looks at the mid-term and long-term impact over a series of dimensions, including impact on per capita income and sector of employment. With regard to the latter they do find a reversal for some categories. [You can find it here.](#)

*How did BRAC defined 'graduation'? Moving above the poverty line? Arbitrary threshold?*

Actually, beneficiaries graduate when the intervention finishes. There is no individual assessment to check whether they have moved above a certain income threshold.

*How much do we know about the impact of cash transfers versus graduation programs?*

There is no evaluation comparing both types of programmes as alternative interventions (e.g. different arms treatment in an RCT).

*Doesn't graduation to another social protection programme encourage dependency?*

- 1 - There is no evidence that social cash transfer programmes generate dependency. Have a look at [Ashu and Ben's opening presentation](#) and the slide on the myths about social cash transfers;
- 2 - Social protection is not just to the poor. Social protection exists to protect all persons against risks and contingencies that may occur throughout their lives. It can be non-contributory or contributory. If some person "graduates" from a means tested social assistance programme, she should be able to contribute into a social insurance/security scheme and enjoy social protection and income security in case she loses her work capacity and cannot generate income;
- 3 - Our real challenge as per the SDG agenda is to graduate from extreme poverty and reduce poverty rather than graduation beneficiary from social cash transfers. Graduation from poverty is the cleanest definition of graduation.

*Are there any studies on the long-lasting effects of graduation models?*

See Misha, F.A., Raza, W., Ara, J. & Van de Poel, E (2014) "[How far does a big push really push](#)"? Mitigating ultra-poverty in Bangladesh. And article on page 29 of the PIF Debating Graduation - [The labour market of the ultra-poor.](#)

*Scalability & replicability of graduation approach?*

Graduation projects are no doubt more resource intensive compared to other types of development policies, which may translate in high costs vis a vis other time of interventions depending on the context and the on design of the programme. The regular visits to participants as part of the coaching phase may imply the deployment of large number of personnel. Not surprisingly, some evaluations have looked at the real contribution of these visits and whether they should have a low or high

frequency and each individual component of the programme. Relative high cost may imply that governments from low income countries cannot mainstream and scale up these interventions.

*What are future graduation approach iterations looking into?*

See article "[What does the future hold for graduation?](#)" on page 11 of the PIF Debating Graduation.

*If graduation should be embedded into wider systems, how does a national structure actually start on this process - through specific programmes?*

It would depend on the context and gov sectoral priorities. Identifying programmes in sectoral ministries that could be linked with social cash transfers. Important to think on changes in design and implementation necessary to facilitate uptake and impact of these programmes for the (extreme) poor. Important to have a policy framework (remember the last SDG target 1b) that supports coordination and coherence of these interventions.

*How would you compare the intensity of assistance in a graduation model with a cash transfer program and what is the implications of policy adoption?*

If you mean assistance via “coaching” and “home visits”, they are much higher in Graduation Programs and can take a big chunk of the budget compared to cash transfers. There are evaluations looking at the impact of different intensity of visits and the findings show that they would not be determinant for the impacts.

*Can we graduate entire household?*

From poverty? Yes, if pathways are tailor-made for its different members.

*What factors are considered in determining the lead time for a poor household to graduate? Is this a universal approach?*

In graduation models the intervention is time-bounded regardless of the success of the individual with his business. But one could think of a smoother exit...

*Is graduation a ‘one-way’ street? What if someone who ‘graduated’ falls back as a result of a shock to livelihood?*

That’s why we need social protection systems in place. I suggest you read the articles on page 33 and 40 of [Policy in Focus](#). Both discuss this issue.

*How do the productive impacts of the BRAC package compare to those measured in the Transfer Project?*

There is no impact evaluation setting comparing the two types of intervention so that productive impacts could be measured in the same environment. But notice that the cash plus evaluations of the Transfer Project are based on regular cash transfers rather than time-bound food/cash transfers.

*How is the BRAC model linked to social protection programmes? Are they targeting the most vulnerable people?*

The BRAC model is not linked to SP programmes. In some of the adaptations in other countries, it has been linked, but the CT component continues after the end of the graduation interventions as it is meant to affect other outcomes.

*How does one apply the graduation model to cash transfer schemes targeted towards addressing child poverty e.g closing gender gaps in school enrollment?*

In this case, one has two different objectives. The cash transfer should continue until the child girls complete their education.

*How do we encourage a multisectoral approach for the government to coordinate amongst ministries and strategic bodies?*

Good question. Good policy framework and clear coordination mechanisms are important, as well as social registries and interoperability across programme's MIS.

*How do BRAC graduation programmes compare to graduation programmes implemented by governments?*

There is no comparison looking at this aspect. But it would be important to look at it.

*Did the evaluation take time to dig into the underlying causes or drivers of poverty in the various regions?*

That needs to be done in the design of the intervention...and then inform the evaluations.

*What is the general definition of graduation? Is it moving out of a social cash transfer programme or is it improvement in wealth?*

See Fabio's [definition of graduation here](#).

*BRAC model only worked in Bangladesh given the immense BRAC infrastructure and created a parallel structure to government programmes. Is it hence relevant for us?*

Indeed, the scale it needs to work means that only with mainstreamed by government through public policy and it will be able to make a real contribution.

*Are graduation programs a fast track for what an overarching development policy should be doing?*

It is an attempt to fast track it, it may work for some, but not for others. And it runs the risk of diverting attention to core development policies.

*Should we focus on the graduation from poverty or graduation from social protection? How can we advance a unified approach for the former instead of the latter?*

Definitely graduation from poverty. Addressing all the causes of poverty in a specific context.

*How does one reconcile the approach of graduating one beneficiary at a time with the occurrence of covariate shocks?*

The lack of long-standing social protection in the Graduation model means that in the occurrence of a covariate shock, many of the gains observed just after the end of the intervention may be lost.

*Are their good examples of graduation models implemented fully by government structures?*

Some pilots, yes. But large scale is still missing.

*What operational structure/s are critical to facilitate graduation?*

From poverty? Broader multi-sectorial policies that addresses all the causes of poverty.

*The BRAC package is intensive and expensive. How does it translate to government contexts, where capacity (fiscal and sometimes human) is often weaker?*

That remains to be seen. In some countries e.g Pakistan it is being scaled up in line with the cash transfer (BISP). We need to wait for evaluations. How to adapt?

*Who decides on what a household receives at graduation? One-size fits all package? How is it done?*

It varies...sometimes there is a menu with a set of options. In the case of investment grants there is more flexibility.

*What are key pathways towards economic inclusion? Is social protection a necessary and sufficient component?*

Social protection is necessary...but not sufficient. Labour market and agriculture policies also need to be part of a broader strategy.

*Why is poverty elasticity low in sub-Saharan countries?*

One possible explanation is that in many countries growth is led by capital intensive sectors like natural resource extraction. Also, high levels of inequality. See page 34 in the World Bank 2018 Poverty and Shared Prosperity report.

*What do you think of critique of Stephen Kidd that average effects of graduation are not big enough to lift people out of poverty?*

Actually Banerjee et al. (2015) acknowledge that impacts are not big enough to take people out of poverty and discuss constraints that need to be addressed.

*Is there any evidence about graduation process and migration?*

Good question. Not that I am aware. But it is possible.

*IGA is a proxy for household economic capital, does that overwrite the other capitals for sustainable poverty escape? Poor people's aspirations to graduate?*

Certainly, other types of capital human, social, natural are as important to overcome poverty!

*Using BRAC as an example, what is social protection and what is not?*

Graduation model are not social protection programmes. Social protection instruments offer protection against risks and contingencies that can affect any person throughout her life. However, graduation components, if not temporary and offered as an on-going (permanent) public policy, do have a role in social protection systems. They ensure access to services with a view to ensuring social and economic inclusion: training, asset transfer and/or investment grants, health care, counselling, etc.

*Should CT «only» protect? Is graduation expecting something from social protection that is outside its primary objective?*

Important point. In CTs the objective is not consumption support to avoid asset depletion as in grad interventions. They broader objectives and more long term.

*Do you have any ethical guidance for the private sector to invest in social protection in a transformative manner to allow graduation?*

No. But please have a look at [the article on page 67](#) in the PIF Debating graduation.

*Optimism is part of that famous unobserved heterogeneity across households. Policy implication is that it's hard to pick winners.*

Indeed, we can't even predict that Brazil will reach the last stages of the World Cup. I wonder if the optimism is a predictor, but basically a co-result of the same factors that were driving the high flying.

*Can we say that anyone who lives on more than US\$1.90 a day is not poor? Are the transfer programs designed just to ensure people living on more than \$1.90/day?*

1.90 is the international (extreme) poverty line used to track indicator one. Countries need use their own poverty line and poverty estimates for policy making. Moderate poverty and poverty dynamics also need to be factored in.

*Do we have a comprehensive and long-term plan on eradicating poverty all over the world apart from these programs?*

That's what target 1b means with the national policy framework. Social cash transfers are an important component but they need to be integrated in a broader frame.

### **Cash transfers & long-run human development: Emerging evidence from Latin America**

***Susan Parker (University of Maryland) & John Maluccio (Middlebury College)***

*What led Latin America to start cash transfer programmes in the 1990s?*

JM: At least in part this was a response to poverty conditions exacerbated during economic debt crisis of the 1980s.

*Are there clear results on the long-term impact of cash transfers on the current rural poor and the future generation of the rural poor?*

JM: The review paper distributed (Molina Millan et al 2019) provides evidence on long-term effects but there is no data yet on the next generation as defined by the children of the children.

*To enhance the returns to investing in schooling, can you think of any complementary interventions that could ease youth's transition into rural labor markets?*

JM: Certainly, job market training programs are a possibility, not dissimilar to some of the Cash+ models discussed at the conference.

*What do you think would be the impacts of the recent changes to PROspera to education, labor market impacts and overall poverty reduction in MX?*

SP: I think current poverty will increase due to the reduction in overall transfers. For those youth who already got higher education from the program, the positive labor market impacts should continue.

But for younger generation who will now have lower benefits the education and labor market effects of the program will probably be lower.

*For the cognitive and anthropometric it is important to nuance the results. Does making a difference on these depend mostly on quality of services?*

JM: Of course, quality of services is important, and most programs work to address this (e.g. strengthening health and school systems in various ways). In settings where education is very low, however, even just increasing to upper primary can lead to greater learning.

*Many impacts mentioned (e.g. on schooling) are also observed for unconditional CTs. Why do we need conditions?*

JM: Evidence suggests conditions (which of course have associated costs) augment the impact of the transfers. They are also relevant for political economy considerations as they represent a commitment on the part of the program recipients.

*Africa has a huge highly severe problem on youth employment opportunities - is it really comparable to the Latin America?*

JM: As in Africa, there is substantial heterogeneity across countries in Latin America with some at comparably low-income levels and high youth unemployment.

*How does the evidence on the long-term impacts of CCTs compare to that for unconditional cash transfers? How much is conditionality a factor?*

JM: See Baird et al (2013) Campbell Systematic Review 2013:8 for evidence on this.

*Do some of the findings for women on CCTs show that migration is desirable?*

JM: For both men and women, migration to urban areas can be part of an employment strategy, but it does bring costs and risks associated with relocating in different settings.

*With the long-term benefits Mexico's PROGRESO, why did the government discontinue the programme?*

SP: Political decision, they ignored all the evidence. Universal vision of social programs rather than targeted.

*The role of the labor market seems crucial for achieving these long-term effects on earnings.*

JM: Agreed, that especially for widespread or national programs, economic growth and job creation are important.

*Any impact measured on gender dimensions and power structures at community and household level?*

JM: See for example work by Adato in Mexico and El Salvador.

*Do we have a specific and comprehensive approach between ministries that bring about the desired results?*

JM: Most programs operate from within a single "social" Ministry but with necessary high- and low-level coordination with other Ministries, in particular Health and Education.

*Do we have the comprehensive and long-term plan on eradicating poverty all over the world apart from these programs?*

JM: Such a single plan is probably unrealistic, and rather it would be the result of a complex of plans addressing micro and macro aspects.

*Gender differentials in long-term effects of Progressa seem to be very strong. How much of it do you think relate to the design components?*

SP: Well, the education effects for men and women were similar so I don't think the design of the program affected education impacts. The labor market effect of this extra education were greater for women perhaps because women had lower labor market participation than men before the program.

*What strategies do we have to avoid degradation of long-term graduated generations from poverty?*

SP: Keeping the program would have been a good start. Investments in school quality would help a lot currently.

*How do you ensure sustainability of programmes like this?*

SP: Tough question, the evidence did help.

*What model does Mexico used to targeting the poor household to avoid inclusion and exclusion?*

JM: They use a proxy means type model.

*What are implications on long term impact for programs in Africa that may not be conditional and also have low quality services such as education?*

SP: Good question. These evaluations at least suggest long term effects are possible. In Mexico education services are also low quality and significant impacts were observed. To the extent improvements in education are part of the impacts at least through that vehicle long term effects on income may be observed.

## Cash transfers, graduation programmes & livelihood enhancements in sub-Saharan Africa

**Rachel Sabates-Wheeler (IDS) & Gelson Tembo (University of Zambia). Chaired by Frank Otchere (UNICEF Innocenti)**

*What's the policy implication of the finding that high flyers are more optimistic?*

FO: Optimism generally associated with more positive time discounting. People who are optimistic would be more willing to make sacrifices in the moment for potential higher returns in the future. One policy implication is to include behavioural change communication that make people more forward looking.

*Why haven't the Zambia impacts, which were very large at first, persisted over time for most beneficiaries?*

FO: The critical issue is that even people who are non-poor can fall into poverty when they experience a shock (death of the bread winner, bad weather, theft, catastrophic health expenditure, etc). Having a system that people can readily fall back on in times of shock is vital to sustaining impacts. A shock-responsive social protection is the way to dealing with this issue.

*High flyers aside, what's the larger message: i. That many/most positive impacts dissipate once a CT is discontinued? ii. That one shouldn't forget that a large number of households will always need some kind of income support? Or iii. That cash alone won't do the trick and you'll need complementary programs to boost the impact of cash on wellbeing & livelihoods?*

FO: Yes, impacts do dissipate over time (just as with the 'graduation' programs). Cash alone cannot do the trick, so complementary services are essential.

*How does the CWW graduation approach compare to just giving households cash? How cost-effective is it?*

FO: The question of cost-effectiveness between the graduation and regular cash transfers is still not well explored. What the graduation approach seeks to do has its place: to make some households self-sufficient on a regular basis but only require cash in times of crisis. The two approaches should exist side by side.

*How did you define the resilience threshold?*

FO: It is based-on threshold mapped to the poverty line.

*Is having an optimistic outlook a driver or a consequence of flying high? Is optimism correlated with being better off in the first place?*

FO: Good question. It's a difference in difference impact so even if they were better off initially, control households that were more optimistic did not get better off as much as the T households. There is an added value of the cash to the optimism and initial endowment.

*Is graduation social protection?*

FO: 'Graduation' has a role as part of a social protection system. For example, providing skill training so people can become self-reliant can be a part of a comprehensive social protection system.

*Graduation is not for everyone. Some could be exited due to fraud, irregularities or other factors. Has any of the evaluations taken these risks into account?*

FO: 'Graduation' programs typically exit all members in the cohort. Beneficiaries also have incentives to 'lie' to remain eligible for programs. Evaluations do look at operations of CT programs as well.

*This interchangeable use of the term "graduation" is confusing for a lot of people. Graduating from a program may not mean from poverty. Is exit a better term?*

FO: Absolutely agree. It is categorical exit from the program. It does not necessarily mean graduation from poverty.

### **Tanzania's Productive Social Safety Net Selemani Masala & Tatu Mwaruka (TASAF)**

*Are there any benefits that come with the voluntary exit? If not how effective will the comm strategy be in convincing beneficiaries to exit the programme. how does this work in practice? Have people actually volunteered to exit?*

SM: TASAF is still designing the exit and graduation strategy. However, in the initial thinking (plan) TASAF will hire consultant who will develop culturally adequate communication strategy to be piloted and then evaluated for adjustments if any.

*What do you mean by "voluntary" exit? How likely is that?*

SM: Voluntary exit is a situation whereby a beneficiary declares him/herself that he/she no longer need to continue with program due improvement of his/her socioeconomic status. This has been experienced in some of the areas that currently covered by the PSSN operation. This situation make us to believe with strong communication campaign we could get more beneficiaries

*How do you ensure the availability and quality of the services (health and education)? What if beneficiaries are turned away from services e.g. health?*

SM: Targeted beneficiaries, through Grievance Redressal Mechanism (GRM) system, are given access to communicate their views regarding the quality of service provision and on any areas of

improvement needed. The beneficiaries and broader citizenry at large are also able to express opinions on priority setting and thus influence service delivery prioritization processes as well as hold service providers accountable. Reports generated by this process are communicated to PAAs, regional and central level decision makers and provide them with an overview of the issues which have emerged during the course of implementation.

*Kindly inform us the number of children who have benefited from the CCT programme, who would have otherwise missed school?*

SM: Very difficult to get precise figure but in general there is a big number of children who were enrolled after the introduction of the program. TASAF is thinking to introduce a mechanism to track children who have been enrolled in school because of program in future.

*When the variable transfers are withheld because no of non-compliance, how does the programme ensure that it's not punishing children for the wrongs by parents?*

SM: By design the transfer is linked to household and not an individual. This means if a child does not comply the transfer linked to that child is withheld.

*What are the average economic returns to investment in CCT?*

SM: No specific study has been done to measure this. The presentation highlights various productive impacts for the households. There will be intergenerational returns as well, through current households' investments in human capital.

*Will be good to hear more on case management - what structures are in place? Have they worked or not?*

SM: In TASAF case management is a process to gather, identify, record and resolve issues which hinders program implementation. This process is done through the improved GRM system linked to call center.

*Often barriers to access social services are not exclusively economic. Which mechanism does TASAF have to identify the bottlenecks of access to social services?*

SM: The improved GRM systems is the main instrument used to collect feedbacks from beneficiaries and the public at a large regarding various issues including bottlenecks of access to social services.

*How exactly is school attendance tracked? Spot-checks? are the teachers tracking attendance? How are CCT children flagged? By teachers on their lists?*

SM: The compliance form is generated from the MIS application with pre-printed names of children who are required to comply with conditions. The teachers then record number of absent days against names of children in a compliance form which then keyed in the MIS through compliance module. The module then create penalties based on the percentage of absent computed.

*What is the major take home message from TASAF's experience?*

SM: The results of Impact evaluation study are very important to improve program design and implementation. It is important to periodically assess and adapt activities to ensure they are as effective as they can be. Evaluation can help you identify areas for improvement and ultimately help you realize program goals more efficiently.

*How does the programme monitor the use of and performance of the productive grant?*

SM: The performance of productive grant is monitored by the verification committee which has been formed at the village level. The committee consists of Village Executive Officer, 3 Village Council Members and 2 Members of Community Management Committee.

*Can you explain what the mindset intervention and behavioural design components are? Who is your partner organization for these initiatives?*

SM: TASAF in collaboration with Ideas42 and University of DSM are implementing behavioral science pilot intervention through the productive social safety Net (PSSN) projects. This aims to make sure that poverty is reduced and if possible to be eradicated. To make this happen, TASAF is keeping innovating new productive ideas and try to involve the poor households implementing those ideas through community production activities and individual economic activities from the household level.

*When adolescents are supported to start income generating activities, how are those that are still in school treated?*

SM: Adolescents need to attend the trainings and then prepare a plan. For those still attending school, the "plan" can be for education-related costs.

*Cash plus: how does the government plan to use the results of the mid-line evaluation?*

SM: The mid-line evaluation generated learning about the implementation of the first part of the Cash Plus programme (selection and enrolment of participants; livelihood and sexual & reproductive health training) and will be used to strengthen the implementation process. The end-line evaluation will generate lessons about how the programme affects outcomes for adolescents.

*How does the programme ensure that only genuine youth (those optimistic) get on board? The grants could be a motivator?*

SM: The programme is open to all adolescents 14-19 years in PSSN beneficiary households.

*One of the objectives of the cash plus is to avoid early marriage and pregnancy. How does this fit within the national family planning strategy?*

The programme addresses multiple drivers of early marriage and teenage pregnancy (see presentation). It also encourages use of sexual & reproductive health services among adolescents, through strengthening adolescent-friendly health services.

*Are you trying to link PSSN clients to the national health insurance scheme?*

SM: There is no such strategy. PSSN beneficiaries themselves use the cash transfer to purchase community health insurance

*Dropout apparently dropped for girls but increased for boys in cash+ compared to cash. Small comment not necessarily for plenary - should this be addressed?*

SM: This is something the authors of the mid-line evaluation are still looking into.

*Could you name the three types of graduation you mentioned in the presentation?*

SM: In the presentation we mention three types of situations that could lead to household exit from the program. Those are through (1) Recertification process (2) Voluntary quit (3) Automatic graduation

## **Cash transfers, productive inclusion & livelihood enhancements in sub-Saharan Africa.**

***Natalia Winder Rossi, Noemi Pace & Silvio Daidone (FAO)***

*Own production contributes to HSCT impacts primarily on diet diversity but not overall access. What components of DD? Is it Meat/poultry?*

NP: The DD score considers 12 different groups of food: 12 food groups: cereals, roots and tubers, pulses, legumes and nuts, meat/poultry, vegetables, fruits, eggs, fish and seafood, milk and milk products, oil and fat, sugar and honey, miscellaneous. Home production increases the production of legumes and nuts, fruits and vegetables.

*Silvio, did SPRINGS resolve the conflict of interest where children were kept home to help with the gardening rather than sent to school?*

SD: By looking at results we didn't observe any increase in child labour in SPRINGS households. So possibly SPRINGS increased the amount of agricultural activities, especially gardening, which were mostly covered by adults. Children possibly also increased the length of engagement in gardening activities but to an extent compatible with time spent on education (going to school, homework, etc.)

NP: Noemi's answer based on the study of the impact of the Zimbabwe HSCTP. The analysis of the direct and the indirect impact shows that most (95%) of the impact on the number of food items consumed is due to the increased purchasing power thanks to the cash transfers while the impact on dietary diversity shows that part of the impact on dietary diversity is due to the increased purchasing power thanks to the cash transfers (60%) and part of the impact is due to increased own production

(40%). The two results taken together suggest that cash transfer per se is not enough to increase diet diversity. Own production is needed to increase diet diversity.

*We know that at least 60% of the cash is always used for food consumption. How can we say then that cash alone is not enough to improve nutrition diet?*

SD: Are we talking about nutrition or dietary diversity? If nutrition, cash alone, especially after only a couple of years, is insufficient to improve nutritional status. Nutrition is a function of various determinants, including not only food availability but also access to clean water, health services, good behavioural nutritional practices among practices. If we are talking about dietary diversity, the evidence generated by the TP shows that the cash improved this dimension of household welfare without any single doubt.

*Is there concern about incentivizing risk taking behaviour in such a population - how can this concern be mitigated?*

SD: Yes, there is a serious concern that households might fall again into a debt trap, especially: 1. when they borrow for consumption rather than investment purposes; 2. when they borrow for investment purposes without a proper risk assessment of their entrepreneurial initiatives. SPINGS tried to mitigate these concerns by:

1. providing financial literacy;
2. formalizing village savings/loan schemes, which provide a sort of informal peer scrutiny;
3. setting up market clubs, to allow greater awareness of profitable business opportunities.

*How do you explain the difference between food security indicator and diet diversity? Positive impacts on anthropometrics was due to dietary diversity?*

SD: Yes, improvements in anthropometrics are likely a consequence of better dietary diversity and improved nutrition practices.

*What specific component of the program led to positive impacts on anthropometric measures for children? (possible to unpack?)*

SD: Unfortunately we can't unpack econometrically the impacts and determine with certainty which component led to improvements in anthro, but we argue that the result is due to 1) a combination of better dietary practices via CCFLS training, and 2) better diets, due to both improved access to a wider variety of vegetables cultivated at home and higher purchases of other food (non-vegetables).

*How do we balance optimally between the question of adequacy and affordability in social transfers?*

NWR: There are many ways to address this concern. From one side, we can argue that financing is a political issue- a question of choice and government priorities. If a government decides to invest in social protection- including in making its system responsive to all citizens- financing and affordability would not be an issue.

Another angle can be seen from an impact perspective- we need to strengthen our case on why adequacy (including good design and implementation) are key to achieving desired impacts- and thus the need to invest in these to reap long-term benefits in the long run.

*To what extent have the programs presented influenced (or not) the promotion and transformation functions?*

SD: The Lesotho CGP+SPRINGS is an example of a set of social protection interventions that are well integrated with the objectives of broader livelihood promotion and rural development, in particular through linkages with agriculture, food security and nutrition. The results of the impact evaluation however confirm that still more is needed to fully support the transformative function in the lives of the poor through reorienting their focus beyond day-to-day survival towards investments for future.

NP: The Zimbabwe HSCT programme increases diversification in agricultural production and, partly as a consequence, dietary diversity. Diversification of agricultural products is a way to reduce risk and vulnerability to shocks (i.e. price shocks, climatic shocks).

## The political economy of social protection in sub-Saharan Africa Sam Hickey (University of Manchester)

*How are you defining institutionalization? What level of commitment from government is sufficient to conclude SP has been institutionalized?*

Please [check the slides](#) for the five dimensions we use for this. A fuller explanation will be available shortly in the comparative paper that we're just finishing - hopefully this can be circulated to all TP Workshop participants.

*The presentation seems to package all external actors as one, homogeneous group.... and seem to forget non-state actors.*

We actually analysed external actors as different types of organisations with distinctive incentives and ideas - see the Hickey and Seekings UNU-WIDER paper on this. Non-state actors were included in the analysis but weren't prominent in ensuring that programmes were adopted - this really was a deal done between political leaders, bureaucrats and donors. Donors did fund some NGOs to lobby for cash transfers but to no obvious effects. More influential have been programme recipients joining together to pressure their political representatives to scale-up/maintain/extend the scheme, after it has been piloted.

*Isn't it positive if you can merge political interests with social protection needs?*

Yes, in terms of securing a spot for SP on the political agenda. The danger is that programmes only get delivered insofar as they meet political rather than development objectives, which can effect patterns of distribution and targeting, for example, and potentially embed a politics of patronage rather than citizenship.

*Can you undertake a study in Lesotho?*

Actually, Jeremy Seekings' team at UCT did this - see his LIWPR website, the UNU-WIDER working paper series also and a forthcoming open access OUP book for this paper (by Mia Gravnik).

*What about the role of media translating research to inform political elites?*

There is potential here, and it was effective to some extent in pressurizing elites in Uganda to extend their support to the social pension around the 2016 elections. However, some media outlets can also re-enforce prejudices around dependency and deservingness.

*How do you balance sensitivity issues when linking political economy and social protection especially in Africa?*

I'm not sure what you mean here - do you mean discussing difficult/contentious political issues in public? I can see some difficulties here but tend to think that openness is the most useful and mature way forward. I may have read you wrong here though!

*What about interaction, joint effort between transnational coalitions and local CSO in order to influence SP institutionalization?*

This might work and would be worth tracking, especially if CSOs can play a role in helping with accountability and grievance mechanisms. However, I am more interested in the types of policy constituencies that social assistance programmes may bring forth, made up of recipients and their representatives, as I think these will have more political clout than more professionalized.

*Do you have any thoughts on corruption within social protection and how that affects political economy?*

It's early days for this and many donors were very concerned about this (some commissioned detailed fiduciary risk assessments before agreeing to invest). The main example of corruption affecting CTs seems to be the one in Zambia last year, but so far, the programme seems to have bounced back well. Some of the means through which CTs can be delivered are less prone to leakage/corruption than broader-based public or club goods, particularly those that work through mobile money and other technological means, which also helps.

*In the "highly competitive countries e.g. Kenya and Zambia", would the political class support social protection if there was no political mileage?*

Very doubtful! It was only once MPs saw the political logic of these schemes that pressure for scaling-up really took hold!

*How can DPs, CSOs, etc. contribute to minimizing the mistrust between ruling parties and opposition parties towards institutionalization of SP programs?*

Evidence-building, sending joint parties on study tours (within countries), seminars with relevant parliamentary fora/committees - however, we didn't find much evidence that SP was a significant bone of cross-party contention in the countries that we looked at.

*Do you have any thoughts on Governments' reluctance to fund SP from state budget despite significant financial commitments and agreements with DP's?*

Fiscal space is important and the downturn in commodity prices may be driving things here. However, government share of SP expenditure is a poor indicator of commitment: we need to look at the broader picture of budget support and development financing. longer-term higher levels of domestic revenue mobilisation is clearly the way forward as a means of supporting social protection and building fiscal contracts.

### Cash Transfers & Gender

***Tia Palermo & Amber Peterman (UNICEF Innocenti), Melissa Hidrobo (IFPRI)***

*Why do you want to identify design features by quantitative studies rather than qualitative? Qualitative research can answer the why and how questions...*

AP: Thank you for this question--I completely agree with your assessment. The review focused on quantitative impact evaluations (either experimental or quasi-experimental studies). In this context it is possible to test design features, however few studies did so in a meaningful way AND collected relevant gender/women's wellbeing outcomes. However, you are correct that qualitative or operational studies can also give insight into important design features. We must invest in both types of research and be intentional about the questions we ask around gender dynamics. Perhaps in another version of the paper or an extension of this work, we will be able to include qualitative work.

*What is the difference between wage labor and casual labor in the LEAP study?*

TP: Wage labour is defined as whether an individual did any work for a wage, salary, commission, or any payment in kind excluding casual labour, for anyone who is not a member of your household). Casual labour was defined as the number of hours in the last 7 days the individual engaged in casual or part-time labour for anyone outside the household. So, under these definitions, wage labor is preferred to casual labor.

*Could you elaborate more on Gender Based Violence indicators, types, how they are being monitored qualitative as well as quantitatively?*

AP: In the studies reviewed, gender-based violence was overwhelmingly represented by intimate partner violence (four out of five studies collected only IPV), where partners refer to current or recent romantic partner (husband/partner or boyfriend). In this context, IPV indicators were collected following the WHO modified conflict tactic scale -- which ask women sets of behaviourally specific indicators meant to capture different forms of IPV. These types of indicators have the advantage of

being more objective (e.g. did he slap you, did he punch you etc.), instead of letting women determine what they consider to be violent or not. So, for example, studies may collect multiple indicators for each of the following types of violence: controlling behaviours, emotional IPV, physical IPV and sexual IPV. Some studies collected frequency of IPV, as well as asking whether or not it occurred during the recall period (typically the last 12 months). In one study, indicators were also collected in reference to other individuals (e.g. peers, strangers, authority figure etc.). In this review, we only looked at quantitative impact evaluation, so we did not include qualitative studies. However, we draw on qualitative work to inform the discussion.

You can read more about the different indicators used in: Buller AM, Peterman A, Ranganathan M, Bleile A, Hidrobo M & L Heise (2018). [A mixed-method review of Intimate partner violence and cash transfers in low- and middle-income countries](#) World Bank Research Observer 33(2): 218-258 (open access).

*Is 5 to 11 pp impact on IPV a big impact? How does this compare to other interventions around IPV? In other words, are cash transfers a main tool against IPV?*

In a review paper examining the impact of cash transfers on IPV, the percentage point (pp) impact of various programs translated into 11% to 66% decreases in IPV incidence/prevalence. While we do not have an idea of the full range found in programming with IPV as a main objective, these impacts are quite substantial, particularly given that cash transfers were largely not implemented with any IPV (or gender!) objectives in mind. We see these impacts as promising particularly because cash programming is reaching a large number of women, and therefore even decreases which may seem small can be meaningful if they occur en masse. That said, cash transfers are first and foremost a poverty reduction tool, and should not take the place of dedicated vertical programming focused on violence. These types of dedicated programming are definitely much needed, as IPV is pervasive globally and needs to be addressed with a multi-sectorial approach.

*How do you handle male backlash behaviours following women economic empowerment?*

Ideally, programs will be designed in a way to mitigate against backlash -- or if this occurs unexpectedly, there is at least a strong monitoring or grievance mechanism to be able to alert staff that this is happening (and in what contexts, and why). Although there is little evidence that this is happening from rigorous quantitative or qualitative evidence within cash transfers, it is certainly a possibility. There is a nice guide that was developed by CARE and UNC which gives some options of how to monitor for such backlash behaviours and what to do about it. Resistance is often highest in setting with more unequal norms, particularly in initial program stages, however the hope is that over time and as more women become empowered--these norms will shift.

Further reading: [Guidance for Gender-based Violence \(GBV\) Monitoring and Mitigation within Non-GBV Focused Sectoral Programming](#)

*Do you think impact would be higher if the CT was given to the women? Some feminists have doubted that this will increase empowerment.*

MH: We don't actually know. In the conceptual model from the Buller et al. 2018 review paper (mentioned above), cash transfers to women may decrease IPV by improving her bargaining power with the relationship and allowing her to assert her preferences for less violence. However, her

partner may either accept this shift in power dynamics or react negatively to this shift in power dynamics if he feels threatened. Although in theory, the impact could go either way, most studies find decreases in violence when cash is given to women. However only one study directly compares giving cash to women versus men in Kenya and finds decreases in IPV in both cases.

*You described that women's empowerment may both increase or decrease IPV. Any evidence on what determines the direction of the relationship?*

MH: That is a good question. We don't actually know, but I would think social norms would influence the direction of the relationship--where increases in IPV are most likely to be found in settings of high gender inequalities and patriarchal norms. That being said, most programs in a mixed method review of cash transfers and IPV (Buller et al. 2018, mentioned above), found that giving cash to women decreased IPV. Further, in many of these studies, women's empowerment was explicitly mentioned as a hypothesized pathway, although many quantitative studies were not able to test this directly.

*If you could examine the effectiveness/role of one program design feature for IPV, which would it be?*

AP: This is a hard question! Since there are at least three key mechanisms through which cash transfers are hypothesized to reduce IPV (poverty pathway, intra-household conflict, and women's empowerment) -- hypothetically any program design which leads to additional impacts along the casual chain could result in larger reductions in IPV. I think no one design feature is key, but rather, different design features will matter more across settings according to norms around IPV and women's empowerment. That said, I think the role of group-based components attached to cash transfers are really promising--as they give women social networks, social standing and increase their sense of self-efficacy/empowerment. The exact operational component could vary, from training sessions to self-help groups/savings groups or something else. Pairing this social empowerment with the economic transfer and including men in the process has a lot of potential. It would be great to test this against another design feature more focused on economic empowerment alone (e.g. financial inclusion or an individual livelihood component) in different settings.

## **Cash transfers & children's productive activity**

**Jacob de Hoop & Luisa Natali (UNICEF Innocenti), Ervin Prifti (FAO)  
Chaired by Kevin Hong (USDoL)**

*Is half dollar enough to incentivize children's enrollment?*

EP: Considering that the basic transfer size is around 8 dollars, half a dollar represents 6% of the total transfer size. Plus, the whole transfer is supposed to be spent on children to maximum amount possible and the 0.5 USD is introduced to differentiate among households with different compositions. That said, the debate on the optimality of the transfer size for a given outcome is still open, although governments seem to prefer transfers that amount to 20% of a poor household's monthly consumption expenditure.

JJH: It is not possible to give an exact dollar amount that will incentivize children's school enrollment. This will be context specific. In many of the Transfer Project countries, transfer values equal to 20% of

household income appear to lead to substantial improvements in school enrollment and other beneficial impacts.

LN: There has been work on trying to define the optimal size of transfers, however it is not conclusive. As a rule of thumb, the Transfer Project evidence indicates that transfer levels that amount to less than 20 percent of pre-program consumption might result in little impacts whereas those above this threshold might actually lead to larger and stronger impacts. In Karamoja, the transfer level was relatively small and around 10 percent of pre-program consumption (roughly USD 12 over a 6-week cycle): this might have not been enough to entirely compensate for the cost of schooling. Many factors may influence the impact of the program on education outcomes including the context/initial conditions, and/or design features such as the level and regularity of the transfer, the targeted population and the primary objectives (and possibly related messaging and/or labelling) of the program.

*Which programmatic/operational features can be included in CT/CT+ programmes to avoid using child work to deal with increased engagement in productive activities?*

EP: The SCT in Tigray was formally unconditional, but it was accompanied by soft conditionalities consisting of messaging on how to spend the transfer. One extra measure that could avoid that the transfer leads to greater child labor may consist of the introduction of formal conditionalities on school attendance and periodic health center visits.

JH: One possible feature could be to make child work more salient. The programs could comprise a component that provides information about the importance of education and the role of work in children's lives. It would be very interesting to explore the role of such information provision. Then of course, there is the possibility of making programmes conditional on school participation. But that would significantly change the nature and philosophy of many of the programmes we study in the Transfer Project.

LN: One option could be to set larger transfers: this might still not be enough to offset the opportunity cost of schooling especially if poverty is not the only reason for children's involvement in work (other reasons could for instance include the households' perception of low returns to education, and valuing children's work as building experience). In these cases as Jacob suggested it can be important to invest in sensitization/communication around the importance of schooling and the detrimental impacts of child labour. Messaging and/or labelling could be attached to the program rather than conditionalities, when children's schooling is among the primary objectives of the program. This for instance was not the case in Karamoja where the focus of the program was on overall household food security and very young children outcomes (mostly ECD) rather than children's schooling more broadly. Cash plus should build on knowledge of the specific setting and the underlying reasons for child labour apart from poverty (is it related to a supply side constraint, for instance, such as lack of school infrastructure or sufficient excess capacity to accommodate additional students?).

*Is the increase of child labour (as result of labour constraints) reason to be reluctant about the introduction of cash transfers in these setting? Or do we need additional interventions? What type?*

JH: I would not argue that this is a reason not to provide cash. The evidence on the wide-ranging positive effects of cash in other domains is too abundant. But I do think it's worth exploring additional interventions to address increases in child labor. See also my response to the previous question.

*Could you please comment if there were any gender differences in outcomes of your research?*

For Malawi and Zambia, we looked at gender differences in some detail. The short answer is yes, there were gender differences. Girls are more likely to engage in household chores than boys overall. And impacts on economic activities and household chores were significantly stronger for boys than girls. This quote from our Malawi/Zambia paper provides more detail: "Endline data for the control group show clear gender patterns in the activities carried out by boys and girls in both countries [...]. Boys were significantly less likely to engage in household chores and significantly more likely to engage in economic activities. Gender differences were bigger in Malawi than in Zambia. [...] In Malawi, some of the increases in engagement in household agricultural enterprises and household chores were significantly weaker among girls than among boys. In Zambia, where gender differences in child activities are smaller, statistically significant heterogeneity is not observed in program impacts by gender."

*From the presentations made by Jacob and Luisa, did the researchers apply local knowledge and national child protection systems in determining if children were actually being exposed to child labour activities?*

KH: In addition to any response Jacob and Luisa may provide, I'd like to mention that the definition of child labor is based on the international standards, which many countries have ratified, and national legislations which reflect unique circumstances of each country (i.e. representing local knowledge). In my opinion, leveraging national child protection systems to assess child labor is a great idea but the reality is that this system may not be fully functional or with complete coverage in many countries. This can be an argument for investment in strengthening such systems as part of a broader discussion about social protection.

JH: As mentioned by Kevin, our definitions are based on the international conventions (ratified by the countries we work in), national legislation and the recommendations of the International Conference of Labour Statisticians. We rely fully on child engagement in economic activities as recorded in household surveys. No other sources of local knowledge or systems were consulted (and I foresee real challenges in trying to do so).

LN: My response is fully aligned with Jacob's.

*I notice in Tanzania we provide income generating activities to adolescents. At the same time, we worry about child labour incentives. What about the children's agency? In poverty they likely appreciate the chance to contribute to increased income.*

EP: According to UNICEF's of ILO's definition, the total amount of time spent doing chores or economic work constitutes child labor only if in excess of some thresholds or if conducted in hazardous circumstances. The definition allows for ample involvement of children in productive or unproductive activities, provided that these do not take up too much time and are carried out in safety.

KH: The international convention and most national legislations allows adolescents to work (usually up to 14 hours/week for younger adolescents and more for older adolescents as long as they don't engage in hazardous activities). The mixed method research Jacob presented certainly bring up children's agency and desire to work and contribute. But if they are prioritizing income generating now over staying in school and improving long-run income potential, does a social protection system have

a role to play to help them consider long-term impact and break the cycle of inter-generational poverty?

JH: As mentioned by Kevin, children's agency features strongly in our qualitative research. Children are often proud to contribute to household income and sometimes their contribution is a real necessity. That being said, both parents and children also recognize that child work may affect schooling and expose children to hazards. It all depends on the types of activities children engage in and the intensity of child work. This is explicitly recognized in the international conventions, which provide guidance on appropriate forms of work for children.

LN: I do not have much to add to what has already been said but following on previous responses I believe it becomes important to collect information not only on time spent working but also on the types of activities children are involved in (i.e. hazardous activities?).

*"To intervene with CTs or not to" is the dilemma these research findings put us in. Would the three researchers argue for or against for CT and children's productive activity?*

EP: According to UNICEF's of ILO's definition, the total amount of time spent doing chores or economic work constitutes child labor only if in excess of some thresholds or if conducted in hazardous circumstances. The definition allows for ample involvement of children in productive or unproductive activities, provided that these do not take up too much time and are carried out in safety. I would totally argue in favor of cash transfers accompanied with soft or hard conditionalities or complementary interventions that increase access to labor saving technologies.

LN: I believe that overall we see that cash transfers improve household welfare and children's wellbeing. Engaging children in work might not be bad per se and actually could have some positive benefits as long as it does not crowd out schooling, and/or it does not tip over into child labour.

*Are there specific enterprises or livelihood activities where the risk for child labor is heightened?*

JH: The increased risk was strongest for household ownership of livestock. In the settings we study, many households appear to invest cash transfers in livestock.

*There appeared to be large shifts in labor patterns across farm and non-farm—thoughts?*

EP: In the rural woreda, there are no such shifts for the whole sample. The program leads to no effects on any type of activity. There is a decrease in the time dedicated to chores and farm work in the subgroup of younger children (5-14). If time reallocation is taking place, it is between what we record in the questionnaire (work/chores) and leisure/education.

In the urban woreda, in the whole sample there is an increase in both chores and own farm work while there are no effects on the other types of activities. here the opposite pattern of time reallocation might be in place.

In any case, in any of the two woredas, effects for two specific types of activity go in opposite directions. hence, no internal reallocation is taking place.

## Methodological Corner

**Clare Barrington (UNC) & Silvio Daidone (FAO)**

*What do you mean by communities? Is it villages or households?*

It's group of villages.

*What kind of methodological arrangements would you suggest to have in place at the DESIGN stage of an impact evaluation in order to explore the mechanisms behind causal impact.*

**CB: Answer**

*Mixed feelings: mixed often means in parallel or sequenced but not always true integration at all stages of research. How can we better ensure mixed methods instead of just multiple methods?*

**CB: Answer**

*Climate adaptation and sustainable livelihoods is key- how does this link with the graduation approach? Is this one component?*

SD: I have never heard about climate change adaptation in a graduation model, but possibly it already exists and I am not aware. If it doesn't exist, it should be planned unavoidably looking at the country specificity. However, more than a graduation model/project, it should be viewed in the context of a broader developmental policy.

*Are you planning to randomize the trainers as well?*

SD: This is something it has not been discussed but that can be eventually be proposed. However, for indigenous communities this might not be feasible, because of language barriers.

*Claire/ silvio: any specific recommendations when working with indigenous/ethnic communities, in terms of qual research?*

**Answer CB:**

*This reforestation approach is new to the country stakeholders or it has been applied for example with well-off farmers?*

The approach hasn't been applied to well-off farmers and for two reasons: 1) the well-off farmers are those deforesting for the production of biofuels (soya, in a nutshell). It's very unlikely that the value of the E-CCT will compensate the loss of production; 2) Well-off farmers will be targeted with the second component, that will allow them to produce seedlings on an industrial scale. However, this kind of

interventions is not new for the region. It's called "payment for environmental services" and has been applied for instance in Costa Rica, with the Pagos por servicios ambientales (PSA).

*Policy makers tend to have a preference for figures and percentages, how can qualitative evidence only be presented in a way that interests policy makers.*

**Answer CB:**

*Somehow missed the difference between convergent and embedded design. Which one is better?*

**Answer CB:**

*What is the earliest recommended timing for the first process evaluation to be conducted?*

SD: There's not really a recommended timing for conducting a process evaluation, which should be nested within the context of a robust monitoring framework, allowing almost just-in-time support to programme implementers. For short-term projects (<2 years) a process evaluation at the end of the project should be enough, while for longer projects, a yearly evaluation would be more informative.

*Using a community as a unit of analysis, how will you ensure quality and demonstration of real change given the potential challenges you outlined in your last slide?*

SD: There are few issues to distinguish:

1. National stakeholders felt that quantitative methods may not be the best to capture evidence on indigenous communities. For this reason, for these groups qualitative assessments might be better.
2. However the quantitative methods are still very much required, because we need to have a "number" which allows us to say whether the program was successful in achieving land reforestation.
3. With the help of high-quality satellite data, we should be in a position to capture changes at both community (relatively easier) AND household level.

*Are there examples in the Transfer Project of mixed methods for cash plus? Or it has been used just for the cash transfers?*

As shown in session 5B, the Lesotho CGP+SPRINGS impact evaluation adopted a mixed methods strategy to evaluate the combined effects of the cash provided by the CGP and of the package of interventions offered by SPRINGS.

## What is Cooking?

**Yves Dublin (UNICEF Kenya), Debebe Barud Dera (Gov Ethiopia), Daouda Yahaya (FAO Mali), Moussa Sankara (UNICEF Burkina Faso), Felix Matusse (Gov Mozambique), Brian Kiswii (UNICEF Malawi)**

*Kenya Solar Light: What's the idea behind targeting 9-16 years old over younger children?*

YD: Yves: One of the objectives of the programme is to improve learning outcomes of school going children and in particular increase the number of hours studies by children. For that reason, we are targeting households with children that are in age of going to school. 9-16 was the initial suggestion, in the meantime we increased from 7-17 (as with 18 they might be exited from the Cash transfer for orphan and vulnerable children).

*Mozambique: Is it possible to give the new child grant already during pregnancy to unlock nutrition potential? How long does it take to enroll beneficiaries, what is required to ensure support as early as possible?*

FM: A Child grant is meant for children from 0 to 2 years. Before that a mother can be enrolled in other programs to prevent malnutrition. There are other programs run by government aimed at mothers at risk. The enrollment process is quick can. The first payment may take minimum of a month to occur. to ensure early intervention, mother attending health center for control are identified and enrolled immediately.

*For making a compelling argument for cash+ programmes, would it be possible to focus on the interaction between e.g. cash/nutrition or cash/health in evaluation? We could then promote benefits of combined instead of separate interventions.*

Yes, there are several IEs looking at this. It is also useful to measure cash versus cash+ to see what the + adds, if anything. This can be a challenge logistically.

YD: Yes, very valid point, more and more evaluations are doing this, e.g. Ethiopia INCST (cash plus nutrition and child protection), INSP (cash plus health insurance), Kenya NICHE (cash plus nutrition), Kenya Cash plus energy, Ghana LEAP 1000 etc.

*Cash + or Cash + + + + ... capacity to deliver at scale? delivering a + or connecting families to broader health, education or agriculture systems?*

Raises the question whether we are unable to let go of the magic bullet we found with the first impact evaluations. Can social protection replace broader social and even development policies? On the other hand, CTs are a strong entry point.

YD: As mentioned during my answer, the key here is to focus on connecting existing programmes rather than introducing new interventions. In that case the support needed at scale will be focused rather on the capacity building and coordination aspect. Most of the plus programmes (e.g. health, nutrition, education, agriculture) are already existing but they are disconnected from the SP/CT programmes. The main objective of the cash plus intervention should be to bring them together and have these pluses targeted to the most vulnerable who are often left out with regards to access to basic social services

*Mozambique: How easy has it been for your country to implement the legal framework on Social Protection in light of the fact that most African countries have inadequate fiscal space to deliver to every poor citizen.*

FM: It is a fact but in Mozambique the ensures that in budgetary system there is percentage for social protection programs no matter the actual economic situation. There might be limitations for expansion and increase the number of beneficiaries but always it is guaranteed by Government the allocations for social protection.

*What is the role of private sector in financing the Cash +?*

YD: In the case of the Kenyan cash plus solar energy programme the private does not necessarily play a financing role, but more a role of corporate social responsibility as they are trying to adjust their business model to the needs of the poorest and most vulnerable (e.g. modified re payment schedule (more tranches, smaller amounts), modified deposit, last mile distribution, etc).

FM: The cash +++ transfer programs are government responsibility the private sector have minor role on it. However, they can participate in delivering other services relevant for the beneficiaries whenever necessary.

*Africa is being ravaged by violence with refugees across member nations and women and children are the vulnerable group. Are there any Social Protection strategies for peace?*

FM: Refugees are protected according with international norms for countries to assist this population. They have access to basic social services like any other citizens, but they may not be eligible for the national programs meant for local citizens. We need to think on how best we can integrate the refugees in local system of social protection.

### Evidence to Action

**Jennifer Nyakinya (NIERA), Susan Mlewa (SASPEN), Josephine Mwangi (SIDA Kenya), Paul Quarles van Ufford (UNICEF Tanzania) & Innocent Phiri (Government of Malawi)  
Chaired by Ashu Handa (UNC)**

*Innocent, how do you get the evidence? How do you like and don't like the evidence to be presented (what document, format etc)?*

IP: We get the evidence through:

- The usual monitoring processes of the program where indicators in the management information system are used to general evidence on the program performance and the field exercises are done.
- Different evaluations which are commissioned by government with support from the development partners.

Format of presentation:

- The usual reports are fine for a technical person, but the challenge comes when you want to present the findings to the policy makes who are not technical in nature.
- Some report, like the impact evaluation we had, have good executive summary which present the findings in a simple way if that can be applied to all the indicators in the evaluation and those who need more details go inside the main report. This can help.

*How can researchers be evidence diplomats and not just researchers?*

Very interesting! But shouldn't evidence stay «objective» and not be connected to agency. Love the idea of evidence diplomats!

PQ: Researchers can and should definitely be evidence diplomats but always need to keep some level of neutrality. Researchers can closely work with other actors for them to become evidence diplomats or evidence activists. That is one of the roles I see for the Transfer Project.

*Double track process: advanced evidence on complex programs (high-speed) vs. keeping up with the basics. Time for a TP phase 2? Who can possibly fund this?*

PQ: There is enough appetite for regional or country workshops on "TP basics". Bilateral and multilateral agencies can fund this easily. This needs a roster of TP researchers willing to conduct such workshops. New evaluation questions may or may not emerge from these workshops. The TP workshops in which we discuss more complex CT and CT+ evaluations will attract a different audience (since I see the risk that those who come for the basics 'get lost').

*The strength of TP has been government leadership of IE. TP has shown WHAT CTs can do. How to broaden this to answer HOW questions? Operationalising impact. How to transform gender, unlock nutrition etc. IEs take long, not always conclusive*

AH: This is a challenge due to the short-term nature of commissioned IEs. The TP has been successful at getting funds from third parties to extend IEs and look at other questions. This seems the likely approach for now, but it takes time and effort from the TP team. Again, a clear demand from a country is very motivational. Ultimately if there is strong demand from government for this type of information, we will figure out how to get it done.

PQ: There is a space for better 'mixed methods' research to truly integrate deeper research questions in evaluation design

*How to increase the evidence base from the social protection sector beyond social assistance/cash transfer to inform Social Protection Policy/strategy in all its dimensions?*

AH: This needs to be demand-driven to gain traction. So the question is how to generate interest in these questions in-country.

PQ: I think the point is more about positioning CTs and evidence on CT impact in the social protection domain. Position the CT programs we evaluate into the context of a) other CT or other social assistance programs, and b) contributory social protection programs. This would help to avoid looking at CTs as interventions that 'graduate' participants - and instead consider CT programs or beneficiary groups for whom graduation is not the issue (i.e. elderly, persons living with a disability, vulnerable children) and emphasis life-long social protection whether through non-contributory or contributory programs.

*How can the transfer project encourage involvement of more national researchers in a meaningful way?*

JN: Create platforms for engagement, knowledge exchange and transfer amongst national researchers. There is potential for cross border learning within the African continent.

Form collaborative partnerships with local institutions such as NIERA that is a network of solely East African scholars.

Include qualified national researchers as Principal Investigators or Co-Principal Investigator in research proposals.

*In order to make evidence even more meaningful, there is a need to package it in simple language that can resonate with communities and beneficiaries. How do the researchers intend to do this?*

AH: The TP has been doing this through user-friendly presentations (colourful graphs, simple explanations) and short research briefs that summarize the key results. Technical info is available but kept separate, it is there for those who want more.

PQ: Not sure this is the role of researchers. Perhaps a partnership between researchers, government, CSOs?

*How best can we leverage local knowledge / African based evaluators to build more ownership of the results and one way of contributing uptake of the evidence for policy/ programming?*

AH: Those commissioning studies can require meaningful local participation on the research team. Currently this is done by funding agencies such as 3IE. University professors at local schools are often over-worked with heavy teaching/advising requirements, so need to find a mechanism to free up time for basic research.

SM: There is need for more research to show how incorporating local ideas and community priorities leads to success, this will promote the incorporation of our culture and local knowledge to have a better understanding of our realities and develop appropriate solutions. One way of contributing to the uptake of evidence is not only to limit interaction between researchers /CSO and policy makers, but also create channels and opportunities for communication between local communities and national policymakers at all stages of the research creating a channel for demand.